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STUDENT NOTES
but no other case so clearly distinguishes between the two kinds of
wills.
A Wisconsin case, In re Noon's WiZZZ has been often referred to as
upholding the view that express revocation is immediately effective.
The court referred to the statute, in that case, providing for the revoca-
tion of wills by "another will or codicil, executed in writing", and said,
"therefore, when a second will is drawn and executed with the
formality required by statute, and containing an unlimited revocatory
clause, all former wills are wiped out and held for naught". While the
Wisconsin statute provided further that a will may be revoked, "(or)
by some other iriting," etc., the court did not refer to that part of
the statute. It might be said, therefore, that this decision is contrary
to Whitehifl v. Habing in that it is not based on the theory that a
revocatory clause is effective as a "writing" apart from the will. But
from the cases cited and the general language of the court, it is obvious
that it intended to follow the doctrine as set out by the other cases
without going into any detailed reasoning. Although it might be
inferred from the language of the court that a will revoking by implica-
tion, only, would cause a different decision to be reached, the case does
not hold that, and no such Wisconsin case has been found by the writer.
To summarize briefly: The question whether there is a distinction
between a later will which revokes by express terms and one which
revokes by implication, only, is inseperably connected with the proposi-
tion that express revocation is immediately effective. In many states
this question is settled by statute. Although there are many dicta on
the question only three states are generally conceded to distinguish
between the two kinds of wills, and of these, only one has given (so
far as the writer has found) an unequivocal decision in both respects.
PALmER L. HALL
DIVORCE-ALLOWANCE OF ALIMONY TO THE WIFE WHEN THE
DIVORCE IS GRANTED BECAUSE OF THE WIFE'S FAULT
Alimony was first granted by the ecclesiastical courts of England
as Incidental to a divorce a mensa et thoro. It was considered as the
allowance which a husband, by order of the court, paid to his wife living
separate from him for her maintenance. This was true because the
court could not decree an absolute divorce and the allowance was solely
for the wife's support, to continue during their joint lives, or so long
as they lived separate and apart.'
During the period in which the ecclesiastical court granted the
divorce a mensa et thoro, the decree a vinculo matrimonii was granted
only by act of Parliament when the marriage was for some cause unlaw-
ful ab initio. It should be noted that the husband was entitled to take
z 115 Wis. 299, 91 N.W. 670 (1902).
2II Poll. & Maitland Hist. of Eng. Law (2d ed. 1911), p. 392 to
396; Madden, Domestic Relations (1931), p. 256 to 261 and 319 to 330.
2II Poll. & Malt., Hist. of Eng. Law (2d el. 1911), p. 390; Madden,
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the fruits and profits of the wife's land during the marriage and since
they remained married under the divorce a mensa et thoro, the husband
retained the property of the wife although such property was returned
to her under the decree a vinculo. In the latter it was impossible to
make an award for alimony because the parties were no longer husband
and wife (or had never been) and the right to alimony depended upon
the duty of the husband to support his wife. From the decisions
handed down by the ecclesiastical courts we have the general principle
that a wife is not entitled tQ alimony if the separation or divorce was a
result of her own martial fault.3
The matter of alimony is regulated altogether by statute In all
jurisdictions of the United States but the decisions of the ecclesiastical
courts have had a marked influence on the adoption of such statutes as
will be noted from the Kentucky Statute as follows: "If the wife
have not sufficient estate of her own she may, on divorce obtained by
her,4 have such allowance out of her husband's as shall be deemed equi-
table . . ."5 Therefore under this statutory provision and the decisions
of the Kentucky courts, the general rule is that permanent alimony
will not be awarded to the wife from whom the husband obtains
a divorce because of her martial fault or misconduct.
8
The rule is almost universal that permanent alimony will be
denied to a wife who has been found guilty of adultery.7 The Iowa Court
stated in Fivecoat v. Fivecoat," "as a rule of law, it must be very well
settled that where a divorce is granted the husband on the ground of
Dom. Rel. (1931), at p. 257. That the wife's property vests in the
husband by act of law, see 1 Bla. Comm. (Sharswood's 1872), 433, and
Madden, Dom. Rel. (1931), p. 83 to 94.
31 Bla. Comm. 441; 3 Bla. Comm. 94; Madden, Domestic Relations
(1931), p. 223, ftn. 26; Fisher v. Fisher, 164 Eng. Rep. 1055. (1861).
Italics added.
Kentucky Statutes, sec. 2122 (Carroll's 1938).
8 Gains v. Gains, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 471, 19 S.W. 929 (1892); Tuggles v.
Tuggles, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 221, 30 S.W. 875 (1895); Cottrell v. Cottrell,
24 Ky. L. Rep. 2417, 74 S.W. 227 (1903); Henry v. Henry, 25 Ky. L.
Rep. 596, 76 S.W. 130 (1903); Holman v. Holman, 155 Ky. 493, 159 S.W.
937 (1913); Vallandingham v. Vallandingham, 232 Ky. 123, 22 S.W.
(2d) 424 (1929). See also Re McKenna, 116 Cal. App. 232, 2 Pac. (2d)
429 (1931); Rybakowicz v. Rybakowicz, 290 Ill. 550, 125 N.E. 370
(1919); Lofvander v. Lofvander, 146 Mich. 370, 109 N.W. 662 (1906);
Coffee v. Coffee, 145 Miss. 872, 111 So. 377 (1927); Elliot v. Elliot, 135
Mo. App. 42, 115 S.W. 486 (1909); Damm v. Damm, 82 Mont. 239, 266
Pac. 410 (1928); Isaacs v. Isaacs, 71 Neb. 537, 99 N.W. 268 (1904);
Waring v. Waring, 100 N.Y. 570, 3 N.E. 289 (1885); Harris v. Harris,
31 Gratt. 13 (Va. 1878); Van Gelder v. Van Gelder, 61 Wash. 146, 112
Pac. 86 (1910); Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 11 S.E. 12 (1890).
'Beeler v. Beeler, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1936, 44 S.W. 136 (1898); Dollins
v. Dollins, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1036, 83 S.W. 95 (1904); Robards v. Robards,
33 Ky. L. Rep. 565, 110 S.W. 422 (1908); Phelps v. Phelps, 176 Ky.
456, 195 S.W. 779 (1917); Hickling v. Hickling, 40 Ill. App. 73 (1891);
Fites v. Fites, 62 Ind. App. 396, 112 N.E. 39 (1916); Leupold v. Leupold,
164 Iowa 595, 146 N.W. 55 (1914); Buerfening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn.
663 (187"1); Hulett v. Hulett, 152 Miss. 476, 119 So. 581 (1929).
832 Iowa 198 (1871).
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the adultery of the wife, she is not entitled to alimony out of the hus-
band's estate." Apparently the cases do no,t go so far as to say that it
would be improper to allow alimony to an adulterous wife if it could be
shown that the husband had acquired property through the wife or
through her efforts, through the joint efforts of the husband and wife,
or where the acquisition came through a comparative lifetime of indus-
try on the part of the wife even though the husband was without fault
as respects the adulterous act of the wife. However, it should be noted
that where the wife was granted a divorce on the ground of cruelty,
the husband could set up adultery on the part of the wife as a defense
to her action for alimony and although the Court of Appeals was with-
out jurisdiction to reverse the judgment granting the wife a divorce, it
would reverse so much of the judgment as awarded her alimony.'
The courts have reached a similar result and denied alimony to a
wife when she has been guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct, ° although
It is proper to make an award to the wife for contractual obligations
which the husband owes to her." But where the evidence shows that
the wife has been guilty of such conduct, she would not be entitled to
alimony even though she had been granted a divorce on the grounds of
cruelty.1'2 The courts will also refuse to grant alimony where the evi-
dence shows that the wife was guilty of cruelty,' malformation or
Impotency," and when she had abandoned her husband without legal
justiflcation.1
However strict the rule might appear, the courts have recognized
limitations and exceptions where the husband is granted a divorce and
the particular circumstances of the wife justify the allowance." In a
9Beeler v. Beeler, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1936, 44 S.W. 136 (1898).
10 Tuggles v. Tuggles, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 221, 30 S.W. 875 (1895); Hol-
man v. Holman, 155 Ky. 493, 159 S.W. 937 (1913); Hehr v. Hehr, 203
Ky. 727, 263 S.W. 33 (1924); Davis v. Davis, 210 Ky. 89, 275 S.W. 26
(1925).
Davis v. Davis, 210 Ky. 89, 275 S.W. 26 (1925).
Vallandingham v. Vallandingham 232 Ky. 123, 22 S.W. (2d) 424
(1929).
,3 Hawkins v. Hawkins, 202 Ky. 55, 258 S.W. 963 (1924); Sales v.
Sales, 222 Ky. 175, 300 S.W. 354 (1927); Everett v. Everett, 52 Cal. 383
(1877); Phinney v. Phinney, 77 Fla. 850, 82 So. 357 (1919); Palmer v.
Palmer, 1 Paige 276 (N.Y. 1828); Dart v. Dart, 164 Eng. Reprint 1254
(1863).
"'Axton v. Axton, 182 Ky. 286, 206 S.W 480 (1918); Ward v. Ward,
213 Ky. 606, 281 S.W. 801 (1926). But see Knestrick v. Knestrick,
1 Ohio App. 285 (1913).
1 Lee v. Lee. 62 Ky. 197 (1864); Woolfolk v. Woolfolk, 96 Ky. 657,
29 S.W. 742 (1895); Garrett v. Garrett, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1674, 44 S.W.
112 (1898); Smith v. Smith, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 776, 86 S.W. 678 (1905);
Lampson v. Lampson, 171 Cal. 332, 153 Pac. 238 (1915); Coffee v.
Coffee, 145 Miss. 872, 111 So. 377 (1927); Grush v. Grush, 90 Mont. 381,
3 Pac. (2d) 402 (1931); Wilkins v. Wilkins, 84 Neb. 206, 120 N.W.
907 (1909); Waring v. Waring, 100 N.Y. 570, 3 N.E. 289 (1885); Carr v.
Carr, 22 Gratt. 168 (Va. 1872); Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 11
S.E. 12 (1890).
"Chandler v. Chandler, 13 Ind. 492 (1859); Prichard v. Prichard,
164 Eng. Reprint 1378 (1864), the court held that a decree for judicial
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case where an allowance for alimony would otherwise be denied, it has
been held that if the wife had contributed substantially to the property
of her husband by her funds or industry, her guilt should not be further
punished by a forfeiture of her interest in such property and an allow-
ance of alimony should be made to her.7
In a recent Florida case8 the court found that the wife was guilty
of adultery but also found that she had contributed materially in funds
and industry over a period of years to the husband's business and since
she had a special equity in the business, it was proper for the trial
court to award the wife $2,000 for this special equitable interest and
$800 for attorney's fees. The court stated, "whatever consequences the
wife may be compelled under the law to suffer for her marital derelic-
tion by the severance of the bonds of matrimony, she is not required to
incur the forfeiture of any of her already vested equitable property
rights which were acquired by her while the matrimonial barque was
sailing on smoother seas." But it stated further, ". . . such an
allowance is not alimony and should never be awarded . . . unless
special circumstances . . . show contributions of funds and services
over and above the performance of ordinary marital duties."''
Most jurisdictions have held that it was proper to grant alimony
to the wife on granting a divorce to the husband when it is found that
both parties are at fault" but the Kentucky decisions limit such right
tq cases in which the wife has not been guilty of some moral delin-
quency." In this jurisdiction, where a judgment decreeing a divorce
is not reviewable on appeal in so far as it grants a divorce, it has been
held proper to make an allowance for alimony where the divorce was
separation on the husband's petition on the ground of the wife's
cruelty should make some provision for alimony. The court said that
if there was no judicial precedent for such a provision, the court
would make one and overruled Dart v. Dart, 164 Eng. Reprint 1254
(1863).
1'Luthe v. Luthe, 12 Colo. 421, 21 Pac. 467 (1889); Carlton v.
Carlton, 78 Fla. 252, 83 So. 87 (1919); Fulk v. Fulk, 8 Blackf. 561 (Ind.
1847); Conner v. Conner, 29 Ind. 48 (1867); Fites v. Fites, 62 Ind. App.
396, 112 N.E. 39 (1916); Dragish v. Dragish, 241 Mich. 563, 217 N.W.
769 (1928); Dickerson v. Dickerson, 26 Neb. 318, 42 N.W. 9 (1889);
Cross v. Cross, 63 N.H. 444 (1885); Dailey v. Dailey, Wright 514 (Ohio
1834); Bent v. Bent, 164 Eng. Reprint 1047 (1861). But see Spitler v.
Spitler, 108 Ill. 120 (1883).
Is Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932).
'9Note 18 supra.
10 Pence v. Pence, 6 B. Mon. 496 (Ky. 1846); Pore v. Pore, 20 Ky.
L. Rep. 1980, 50 S.W. 681 (1899); Green v. Green, 152 Ky. 486, 153
S.W. 775 (1913); Burton v. Burton, 184 Ky. 268, 211 S.W. 869 (1919);
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 190 Ky. 13, 226 S.W. 119 (1920); Edwards v.
Edwards, 84 Ala. 361 (1887); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 92 Mich. 104, 52
N.W. 295 (1892); Sheafe v. Sheafe, 24 N.H. 564 (1852). Where the
wife is partially at fault, see Rose v. Rose, 9 Ark. 507 (1849); Dupont
v. Dupont, 10 Iowa 112 (1849); Stiles v. Stiles, 224 Ky. 526, 6 S.W.
(2d) 679 (1928).
2-Green v. Green, 152 Ky. 486, 153 S.W. 775 (1913); Hoffman v.
Hoffman, 190 Ky. 13, 226 S.W. 119 (1920).
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erroneously granted to the husband and the wife's estate was not suffi-
cient for her support.2 RAMON A. WOODALL, JR.
NEGLIGENCE AS CONDUCT
The present discussion is meant to be a treatment of the subject
of negligence-a type of conduct giving rise sometimes to civil liabil-
ity, sometimes to criminal liability,' sometimes to both. There is sub-
stantial authority for the position that criminal negligence differs from
civil only in degree and not in kind.2 'Due to the fact that negligence
on the civil side of the docket has received more attention from out-
standing legal minds than has that in the field of criminal law, material
gleaned predominantly from discussions of civil negligence will be
used. It is submitted that the standard for evaluating negligent con-
duct as discussed in this note is applicable both to civil and to criminal
cases; that "reckless disregard" corresponds to "gross negligence",'
that type of misconduct upon which convictions of involuntary man-
slaughter are based.'
According to the Restatement of the Law of Tortsr "negligence is
any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of
others, which falls below the standard established by law for the pro-
tection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." It will be seen
" Gaines v. Gaines, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 471, 19 S.W. 929 (1892); Hoover
v. Hoover, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 680, 21 S.W. 234 (1893); Tilton v. Tilton, 16
Ky. L. Rep. 538, 29 S.W. 290 (1895); Thompson v. Thompson, 27 Ky.
L. Rep. 516, S5 S.W. 730 (1905); Caudill v. Caudill, 172 Ky. 460, 189
S.W. 431 (1916); Burton v. Burton, 184 Ky. 268, 211 S.W. 869 (1919).
'Clark and Marshall, Crimes (3d ed. 1927) 79, sec. 51; id. at 246,
sec. 204; May, Criminal Law (4th ed. 1938) 260, sec. 159; Davis, The
Development of Negligence as a Basis for Liability in Criminal Horai-
cide Cases, 26 Ky. L. J. 209 (1938).
2 "This last is really, to my mind, what a crime is. It is a for-
bidden act in which society as a whole has a peculiar interest, and in
the prevention of which it is particularly concerned. It is this
concern which brings the state as a juristic person into the matter as a
party plaintiff, and, to my mind, it is this procedural matter which is
the distinction between a crime and a tort." Levitt, Extent and
Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 Ill. L.R. 578, 583 (1923);
11... criminal negligence-is largely a matter of degree . . .", State
v. Lester, 127 Minn. 282, 149 N.W. 297, 298 (1914); "If he knows or
reasonably should know his act tends to endanger life, and that the
death of a human being is not 'improbable' as a result thereof, it is
sufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter by culpable negli-
gence." State v. Studebaker, - Mo, -, 66 S.W. (2d) 877, 881 (1933).
3 Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360, 363 (1926). Compare
also the quotation from State v. Studebaker, supra note 2, with the
Restatement definition of Reckless disregard, infra note 5. And see
Restatement of Torts, sec. 282, comment d, special note: 5.
'People v. Adams, 289 Ill. 339, 124 N.E. 575 (1919); State v. Blaine,
104 N.J. Law 325, 140 Atl. 566 (1928); Rex v. Greisman, 4 D.L.R.
738 (Ont. 1926); Clark and Marshall, op. cit, supra note 1, at 330,
sec. 264a; Wharton on Homicide (3d ed. 1907) 681.
Sec. 282.
